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Liquidity Crises
C. BAXTER, JR.*
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The title, "liquidity crises," is a bold one. In the last decade, we have seen many liquidity
crises, in many markets. These recent liquidity crises are interesting, significant and worthy
of discussion -elsewhere. This article has a more limited scope in that it discusses monetary
liquidity crises only: a breakdown in the payment system that supports all other asset transfers. Monetary liquidity crises are special because they threaten a breakdown in the institution of money itself. Nothing is money if it is not liquid. It is difficult to imagine a complex
market economy that can function without money for any length of time. And although
monetary liquidity crises are only a subset of liquidity crises in general, central bankers
have quite a bit to say about them.
This article touches on several topics. First, it seeks to put modem monetary liquidity
crises in a historical perspective. In doing so, it constructs a classification of monetary
liquidity crises. Second, it discusses the liquidity tools of modern central banks-tools that
may be used for purposes other than monetary liquidity-and seeks to distinguish these
uses. It is important to note that many good liquidity crisis tools might not look as attractive
in other contexts.
Finally, it seeks to apply some of the lessons learned to what some believe to be a future
liquidity problem-the "Y2K" operational issue. The authors want to emphasize at the
outset that they know of no objective evidence that the Y2K event will cause a liquidity
crisis. However, the Y2K event provides a useful analytical device for discussing some of
our points.

I. The Changing Meaning of Monetary Liquidity Crises
The meaning of monetary liquidity crises has changed with time. In the nineteenth century, it was usually linked to a bank run and an insufficiency of metallic money. Today, bank
runs are not only rare, but are unrelated to most modem liquidity crises.
*Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. is General Counsel and Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
*'Joseph H. Sommer is Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The views expressed in this article are
the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or any
other component of the Federal Reserve System. The authors would like to thank Joyce Hansen and John
Kambhu for their valuable suggestions, without thereby seeking to implicate them in any authorial errors.
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But even if bank runs are less relevant, we are still concerned about the collective inability
of banks to make payments when due. This section will show that the cause and consequences of such failure have changed, but such failures can still be grave.
A.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY-LIQUIDITY As GOLD AND CURRENCY

There are several good reasons for beginning with the past. First, many of our monetary
institutions, such as legal tender, are still set firmly in the nineteenth century.' Second, most
of the great monetary liquidity crises occurred in the late nineteenth or early twentieth
centuries, when the world was on the gold standard.
The world did not converge on the gold standard until near the end of the nineteenth
century, probably the 1870s.2 Prior to that, any dominance of the gold standard reflected
the dominance of the Bank of England, which had been on the gold standard since the early
part of the century. For our purposes, the gold standard contained two elements. First, it
required banks to redeem bank money for gold upon demand. Second, it prohibited any
legal tender money, except for gold, or bank notes convertible to gold.' In other words,
banks had to provide gold (or gold equivalent) on demand. Only a tender of gold or gold
equivalents-or consent of the creditor to some substitute, such as a bank credit-could
discharge a debt.4 This prohibition on alternative legal tenders discouraged parallel monetary systems from competing with gold.

The redemption requirement was more central than the prohibition on alternative legal
tenders. Redemption linked the value of bank money tightly to the value of gold. Since
everybody believed that bank money was fully convertible, bank money was more convenient, for most purposes, than gold. Then, as now, people used bank notes, checks and even
wire transfers. Therefore, gold was seldom the medium of exchange, except for interbank
net settlements and some hand-to-hand transactions. In other words, the gold standard had
little to do with ordinary money (the medium of exchange) and much to do with monetary

policy. The merits of this monetary policy, including an assessment of the significance of
gold-standard central bank discretion, is beyond our scope.

1. See Benjamin Geva, From Commodity to Currency in Ancient Histoy-On Commerce, Tyranny and the
Modern Law of Payments, 25 OScOODE HALL LJ. 115, 146 (1987).
2. See Charles Goodhart et al., The Development of CentralBanking, in FORREST CAPIE ET AL.,THE FUTURE
OFCENTRAL BANKING 10-15 (1994). Goodhart, Capie and Schnadt propose 1873 as the date for convergence
on the gold standard. This appears reasonable, but some holdouts remained. The United States, for example,
did not formally adopt the gold standard until the last year of the century, with the Gold Standard Act of
March 14, 1900. (However, "greenback" legal tender currency had been redeemable for gold since 1879.) As
another example, Japan was on a silver standard until 1897, when it switched to gold. Id. at 168.
3. The Bank of England, for example, was obliged after 1833 to redeem its notes for gold. See VERA C.
SMITH, THE RATIONALE OF CENTRAL BANKING 19 (1936, Liberty reprint 1990). Otherwise, Bank of England

notes-a gold-equivalent-were legal tender.
4. The consent of a payee need not be express, however. The law is very happy to read implied consent
in almost any commercially reasonable action by a payor. See F. A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OFMONEY 77
(5th ed. 1992); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 51 (rev'd ed. 1950);

Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REv. 1, 17 (1998); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4A406(b) (1999). This rule is tantamount to a legal tender law for all reasonable tenders. Contrariwise, courts do
not always respect commercially unreasonable legal tenders. See Nemser v. New York City Transit Auth., 530
N.Y.S.2d 493 (1988); Suffolk Bank v. Lincoln Bank, 23 F. Cas. 346 (C.C.D. Me. 1821 (No. 13,590)). As a
consequence, legal tender is a much less important concept than is generally assumed. Goodhart, supra note 2,
at 8.
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Whatever the monetary merits of the gold standard, it was a horrible way to design a
payment system. Gold is a very unprofitable bank asset-it is expensive to store and yields
no earnings. Banks, therefore, kept a minimal amount of gold in their vaults-enough to
meet ordinary redemptions and maybe a little extra for safety. In ordinary times, banks did
not need more. As stated above, even under the gold standard, gold was not a common
medium of exchange. If the banks miscalculated, they could usually purchase enough gold
from their correspondent or on the market.
However, people occasionally lost confidence in a bank's ability to redeem bank money
for gold. Perhaps they lost confidence in the bank's credit or they anticipated a flood of
redemptions. Perhaps their unease was limited to a single bank or it was more general. But
in any case, they lost confidence in bank money and ran for the monetary base-payment
in gold. If this happened to many banks at once-a monetary liquidity crisis-there simply
was not enough gold to go around. At such times, banks that could not pay gold upon
demand simply could not pay. A bank that cannot pay on demand has always been considered insolvent, regardless of the shape of its balance sheet. 5
Because of the redemption rule and its consequences, the gold standard was an engine
of potential instability. Sound banks could become insolvent at any time, unless they kept
enormous (and unproductive) hoards of "reserve" gold. The nineteenth century devised
two constructive solutions to this problem: the gold-standard central bank and temporary
suspension of the gold standard. (Many other solutions were proposed but few of them
6
were constructive. )
The gold-standard central bank was popularized by Walter Bagehot's description of the
Bank of England.7 Bagehot quite correctly (and pointedly) ignored the legal tender note
issue of the Bank of England,' and concentrated on gold emergency lending in times of
liquidity crisis. Bagehot argued that the Bank of England, although fulfilling this role, had
not sufficiently acknowledged it in the past. He viewed emergency lending as the key role
of such a bank, although he acknowledged a secondary role of the Bank of England's discount rate in smoothing the business cycle and stabilizing short-term interest fluctuations.
(Some think that this secondary role might be primary.) But it is important to keep Bagehot's core principle in mind: the gold standard provided the means for setting monetary
policy, while the central bank's primary role was to prevent and dispel liquidity crises.
Gold-standard central banking was risky, in a way we cannot fully appreciate today. Even
gold-standard central banks had a limited stockpile of gold. They could add to this stockpile

5. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(F) (1999). Bagehot was not shy to say the Bank of England had "failed"
WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 96
(1962).
6. Bad ideas came from both sides of the Atlantic. The United States required that national banks maintain
gold reserves, but did not allow them to use the reserves in times of stress. This, of course, defeated the purpose
of the required reserves while imposing the cost of sterile assets on banks. Bagehot thought that each bank
should logically keep its own supply of gold, although to his credit, he did not propose eliminating the central
gold reserve bank. Bagehot explicitly viewed decentralized reserves as "the natural system of banking." BA^EHOT, supra note 5, at 160. However, this "natural" system would probably force banks to hoard far more
aggregate sterile gold reserves than the Bank of England needed to protect the system. See Goodhart, supra
note 2, at 87; Sommer, mpra note 4, at 50 n.160. Subsequent writers, notably Smith, sought to show that
Bagehot's system would provide an adequate gold-based monetary policy. SeeSMITH, supra note 3. They may
have succeeded. However, Smith did not discuss this system's insatiable demand for monetary gold reserves.
when it ran out of gold. See

7. See
BAGEHOT, supra note 5.
8. Seeid. at 1-2.
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only slowly, by raising the discount rate. A gold-standard central bank could, therefore, run
out of gold, just like any other bank. This risk was especially great during a liquidity crisis.9
At such times, even a gold-standard central bank might fail to make gold payments.' 0
When even a gold-standard central bank fails to pay, suspension of convertibility is the
only remaining workable solution to a liquidity crisis. This solution works, however, only
if somebody can create a widely accepted nonconvertible money. This nonconvertible
money could be government or central bank legal tender, private obligations with legal
tender status, or private obligations accepted because the balance sheet-if not the
liquidity-of the issuer was unquestioned. Suspension did not require a central bank, or
even a government. In the nineteenth-century United States, banks could collectively stop
redeeming their liabilities for gold and continue operations as usual." (Note the emphasis
on "collective"; a single bank's failure to pay was a bank failure.) During such suspension,
banks gave customers their own scrip, or simply collected checks as if they were payable in
gold. This fiction worked quite well, especially when the suspension was temporary and the
soundness of the individual banks undoubted.
In the 1920s and 1930s, suspension became a permanent way of life. Without gold, central
banks assumed the entire role of monetary policy, and, perforce abandoned their original
role as liquidity lender of last resort.
It is important to reemphasize the point: old-fashioned liquidity crises cannot happen
under an effective suspension of convertibility, especially when the suspension is aided by
effective deposit insurance. The potential stockpile of base money-currency and central
bank deposits-is nearly unlimited in the short term. 2 Everybody knows this; therefore,
nobody will run to base money. As Schwartz clearly put it: "Real financial crises need not
occur because there is a well-understood solution to the problem: assure that deposits can
be converted at will into currency whatever the difficulties banks encounter."" A run on an
individual bank might still occur, but refugees will be happy with the credit of another bank.
But this is true only for an old-fashioned liquidity crisis-a run for gold or legal tender
currency. The Herstatt failure of 1974 showed that this is not the only kind of liquidity crisis.
Modem liquidity crises do not involve bank notes and do not require the gold standard.
B.

HERSTATT-LIQUIDITY AS CREDIT FLOW

The world financial system continued to evolve from the 1930s to the 1970s. Bank capital
decreased for several reasons: the safety net of deposit insurance, war (which emptied banks

9. See id. at 92-98.
10. The Banque de France, we are told, suspended payments in 1804, 1813 and 1848. See SMITH, sUpra
note 3, at 30, 33. The Bank of England suspended from 1797-1819, and required special legislation in 1847,
1857 and 1866. See SMITH, supra note 3, at 15-16; BAGEHOT, supra note 5, at 14. Central banks even had to
bail each other out. In 1825 and 1836-39, the Bank of England needed accommodations from the Banque de
France. The Bank of England returned the favor in 1846-47 and 1860. See CHARLES KINDLEBtRGER, A FINANCIALHISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 281 (1984). The Banque de France, with Russia, helped rescue the Bank
of England in 1890; it and the Reichsbank again aided the Bank of England in 1906-07. See id.; BARRYEiCHENGREEN,
GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 49-54 (1992).
11. See BRAYHAMMOND, BANKSANDPOLITICS IN AMERICA:FROM THE REvOLurION TO THE CIVIL WAR 22728 (1957).
12. In the long term, a central bank might, however, face some limits in the amount of money it can
manufacture. See Maxwell J. Fry, Can a CentralBank Go Bust?, 50 MANCHESTER SCH. Supp. 82 (1992).

13.

ANNAJ. SCHWARTZ, MONEY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
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of capital), perhaps the abandonment of the gold standard and postwar prosperity (both of
which decreased the perceived need for capital), and good old-fashioned competitiveness.
Banks became less liquid, providing long-term lending, funded in part by time deposits.
Transaction volumes soared, ensuring that an increasingly smaller capital base (or even asset
base) was funding a larger volume of payments. At least in the United States, banks slowly
broke out of their comfortable club and became competitors.
Something had to give. The world rediscovered the monetary liquidity crisis in 1974,
with the insolvency of Bankhaus Herstatt. The Herstatt story has been often told but always
bears retelling.

14

The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates collapsed in 1971. Foreign exchange
rates, unsurprisingly, became volatile. Herstatt was a medium-sized German bank that
played the foreign exchange market with great energy, but little success. OnJune 26, 1974,
it was abruptly closed at the end of the German banking day because of its foreign exchange
losses. Unfortunately, the end of the German banking day was only 10:30 A.M.in New York.
At this time, "Herstatt's New York correspondent bank suspended outgoing U.S. dollar
payments from Herstatt's account. This action left Herstatt's counterparty banks exposed
for the full value of the Deutsche Mark deliveries made .... ,,is
Credit risk is nothing new, although some had forgotten that credit risk lurks in the
payment system, as elsewhere. What was new (or was at least newly realized) was that
Herstatt'scounterpartieshadbeen relyingon this incoming money to make theiroutgoingpayments.

The major liquid asset held by a modern bank is neither gold, currency, securities, nor even
central bank deposits. Modern banks expect to meet their outgoing payment liabilities
primarily with their incoming payment assets. If this stream of credit to one bank is disrupted, it may affect other banks in a rapid chain reaction of delayed payments creating
more delayed payments creating disaster. The modern liquidity crisis does not involve a
run for gold or currency. For a metaphor, think of a high-pressure hydraulic system, containing very little working fluid, circulating at high speed. If the pipe bursts and some fluid
is lost, the system will quickly halt.
This is far more volatile than the liquidity crises of the gold days. Today, a tiny amount
of bank credit supports an enormous value of payments. To take an example, Fedwire clears
about a trillion dollars a day, based on reserve balances of only around $10 billion. In other
words, Fedwire discharges $100 of payment claims with only one (ultra high-velocity) dollar
of reserves. This beautifully economizes on scarce bank credit, if everybody is patient and
confident. But if $100 of payment expectations are simultaneously grabbing for the same
dollar of credit, everybody will come up drastically short.
Fortunately, Bankhaus Herstatt was fairly small. Herstatt's counterparties had enough
spare liquidity to cover their day's payments. But in the next few weeks, the markets were
wobbly, as market participants feared additional insolvencies. Market participants, afraid of
not receiving the payments they needed to fund their outgoing payments, delayed payment
to each other and cut back on their lines of credit. Fortunately, the crisis eventually sorted
itself out, with no formal central bank intervention.

14. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating InternationalBankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt
&
Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1977); JoANr EDELMAN SPERO, THE FAILURE OFTHE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK
(1980); BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
(1996) [hereinafter SETTLEMENT RISK].
15. SETTLEMENT RISK, supra
note 14, at 6.
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But the lesson had been learned. Herstatt (and subsequent events, such as the insolvencies
of Drexel16 or Barings 7 ) trained everybody to beware of major insolvencies within the
payment system. Much of the response has been legal, involving enforceability of setoff and
closeout netting, predictable choice-of-law rules, and general increased transparency in
payment law.'" This movement shifted much of the risk of being a counterparty of the
insolvent away from payment system participants. This added confidence to the system, as
survivors became increasingly confident that none of their counterparties in the payment
system would be dragged down by the insolvency of another payment system participant.
This legal development was accompanied by better clearing house design, tight supervision
and much better counterparty risk management. 19 These efforts have all been coordinated.
The public version of the Allsopp report was widely distributed and accompanied by
press conferences and briefings.2° As well as being sent to individual banks, the report was
made available to other parties, such as banking associations and non-G-10 central banks,
and it continues to be made available to anyone with an interest in the matter or who might
be able to influence market behavior. Central banks have also written articles for commercial
journals or their own publications and have given numerous presentations at conferences."
This coordinated effort may have explained the market's relatively calm response to the
1995 insolvency of Barings, compared to the 1974 Herstatt insolvency.22
In the 1987 stock market break, we learned that the lesson of Herstatt was perhaps too
narrow. Herstatt told us to watch for bank insolvencies, or perhaps the insolvency of other
wholesale financial institutions. But any major breakdown in the transferability of credit
would suffice. Such a breakdown need not come from the insolvency of a major institution.
The stock market break of 1987 almost brought the markets down, without creating any
significant insolvencies. It did so through what might be termed a "bottom-up" chain reaction.
In October 1987, equity asset prices dropped twenty-five percent in one day. Customers
(especially those of equity futures brokers) did not have the liquidity to meet their enormous
margin calls. Liquidity was lacking even if the customers were perfectly solvent and even
if a bank would be perfectly willing to lend the money. There was not enough time to
establish new credit lines, to ascertain creditworthiness, even to get to the telephone. Once
the brokers' customers could not meet their margin calls, the brokers-and their clearing
houses-were faced with the unpalatable option of living with enormous open positions or

16. See id. at 6-7.
17. See id. at 8; see also STEPHEN FAY,THE COLLAPSE OFBARINGS (1996).
18. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK
SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1990) [hereinafter INTERBANK

NETTING
NETTING

SCHEMES]; BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REDUCING FOREIGN EXCHANGE SETTLEMENT RISK:

RESS REPORT

REDUCING SETTLEMENT RISK].
19. See INTERRANK NETTING SCHEMES, supra note 18; SETTLEMENT RISK, supra note
MENT RisK, spra note 18.

20. See

A PROG-

(1998) [hereinafter

SETTLEMENT RISK,

14;

REDUCING SETTLE-

supra note 14.

21. See REDUCING SETTLEMENT RISK, supra note 18, at 21.
22. Barings was in administration for a week before it was acquired by ING, the Dutch bank. See FAY,
supra note 17, at 229-3 1. It is impossible to tell what would have happened if the administration were prolonged.
However, the Herstatt debacle occurred immediately upon news of Herstatt's insolvency. In Barings, there was
at least one week's forbearance. One relatively small settlement problem with Barings is discussed in a report
by the Bank for International Settlements. See SETTLEMENT RISK, supra note 14, at 8.
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liquidating contracts. They quite properly chose to liquidate, a choice that put further
pressure on the market.23
In this environment, banks feared their customers as much as they feared each other. But
the dynamics were the same as those of an insolvency of a large institution. Outgoing
payments slowed for fear that payments would not come in. Unlike the Herstatt event, the
1987 market break required massive central bank intervention. Fortunately, the Open Market Desk purchased enough securities to supply the market with liquidity, and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York expressed a willingness to lend to banks in need. The day's
payments were made, and the system settled.
C. LIQUIDITY AND OPERATIONS
In 1984, a bug worked its way into the computers of the Bank of New York (BONY). As

a consequence, BONY lost its operational capacity to send securities. It could, however,
still receive securities, which caused overdrafts in its funds account. This was a major market
event, because BONY was (and still is) a major bank for clearing government securities. At
the end of the day, BONY received a $22.6 billion loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to cover its overdraft; it also fixed its computer. It repaid its loan the next day
and turned around the undelivered securities. While there were some residual problems
the next day, business did resume close to normal.
Like the Herstatt failure, the BONY operational error introduced the world to a new
kind of monetary liquidity crisis. The BONY error was the first operationalcrisis that threatened a breakdown in monetary liquidity. Unlike the Herstatt failure, which was a mere
harbinger, the BONY operational problem was the real thing-a crisis that called for central
bank intervention. The central banking community was quick to respond. By 1990, the risk
of operational error was officially recognized, as the sixth minimum standard of the Lamfalussy Report.2 4 By 1997, this risk had been enshrined in a major central bank charter, as
a separate ground for emergency lending."
The BONY-style operational crisis, unlike the Herstatt-style credit crisis, could occur in
a world of undoubtedly strong balance sheets. In this respect, it was like the old-fashioned,
gold-standard liquidity crisis, in which a run could develop even if all the banks' assets
undoubtedly exceeded their liabilities. An operational liquidity crisis can occur even more
abruptly than a credit crisis. Many credit crises take time to develop, allowing sophisticated
counterparties to avoid the weakening entity (e.g., BCCI). To be sure, some credit liquidity
crises are abrupt (e.g., the 1987 break or the Barings insolvency), but all operational crises
develop quickly.
The operational liquidity crisis is, in some ways, more complex than a credit liquidity
crisis. If a bank cannot get the funding to make payments, it is in serious trouble. Wellfunded banks, however, occasionally miss a few outgoing payments because of operational

23. See Andrew F. Brimmer, DistinguishedLecture on Economics in Government: CentralBankingand Systemic
Risks in CapitalMarkets, 3 J. EcON. PERSP.3 (1989).
24. See INTERBANK NETrNG SCHEMES, supra note 18, at 32.
25. Article 37(1) of the 1997 Bank ofJapan Law permits the Bank to provide uncollateralized emergency
credit to banks "when they unexpectedly experience a temporary shortage of funds for payment due to accidental causes, including computer system problems, whereby the business operations of the financial institutions
may be seriously hampered if the shortage is not recovered swiftly, provided that the advance is necessary to
secure the smooth settlement of funds among financial institutions."
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glitches. In such cases, their counterparty is likely to acquiesce, probably in return for lost
interest or some similar penalty fee.2 6 In other words, the system is much more forgiving
of operational liquidity problems than credit-related liquidity problems. Operational problems in healthy institutions only become problematic when they are large in scale. One
institution can easily give its counterparty a free ride for one delayed payment, but too
many delayed payments eventually disrupt ordinary intraday funding patterns.
It is risky to treat a major disruption like an isolated error-to "suspend convertibility"
for a day or so and wait for the operational failure to be cleared. This is true even if the
source of the operational problem has unimpeachable credit, if it is large enough. If it were
allowed to fail to settle, it would be injecting a tremendous amount of liquidity in the
system-perhaps enough liquidity to mask the weakness of some other member of the
payment system. When the operational problem is finally fixed, and the payment streams
flow, the artificial liquidity disappears and the weak member might be exposed, having had
the chance to impose several extra days or weeks of loss on the system.
Here is one place in which monetary liquidity crises can be very different than liquidity
crises in other assets. Systemic breakdowns occasionally occur in the settlement of an issue
of government securities. An institution that fails to receive securities might not be able to
perform on its delivery obligations, leading to a chain of fails for a particular issue. This
risk is probably tolerated because a securities delivery-as part of a delivery-versus-payment
transaction-only creates replacement cost risk, not direct credit risk. Money is more risky
because money payments-unlike most deliveries of instruments-are often single-ended
transactions, not simultaneously linked to countervalue.
D.

LIQUIDITY AND CLEARING

HoUSES

BONY's operational problem was spectacular for two reasons. First, as stated above, most
of BONY's government securities transactions were affected. Second-and perhaps more
importantly-BONY was a clearing house. BONY's operational failure directly affected a
huge number of counterparties.
Since the early nineteenth century, central banks and clearing houses have been closely
related. Goodhart views central banks as a sort of publicly operated clearing house: a position with excellent support in United States history.27 Before 1913, U.S. clearing houses
provided most of the functions of modern central banks: payments, emergency liquidity,
and even bank supervision!2" They did not, however, provide monetary policy, which is the
formal purview of the gold standard.
During most of the twentieth century, central banks were ascendant, and private clearing
houses were on the decline. This is understandable for at least two reasons, one obvious
and one more subtle. Settlement requires credit, and central bank credit is obviously the
best around. More subtly, many clearing systems extend clearing credit to their members
and these extensions of credit are usually protected by financial collateral. This collateral
must be extremely liquid, so the clearing system can sell the collateral immediately if a
participant defaults. Such extremely liquid collateral exists-e.g., government bonds and

§ 4A-305(a) (1999).
27. CHARLES GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS (1988).
28. SeeJAMES GRAHAM CANNON, CLEARING HOUSES, S. Doc. No. 491, at 12, 137-47, 178 (2d Sess. 1910).
26. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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standby letters of credit-but is expensive.2 9 Costly collateral is a great source of competitive
advantage for central banks. Only a central bank can transform illiquid (and thus cheap)
collateral into supremely liquid central bank credit. (This operation can be quite prudent;
there is no shortage of relatively illiquid but otherwise high-quality collateral, such as corporate loans.) Therefore, a clearing system that extends credit to its members can operate
more cheaply if it has access to central bank liquidity. For a long time, private clearing
houses could not compete with these central bank advantages and lost market share.
Matters changed, however, starting around the 1970s. New private clearing houses and
settling depositories were created, such as CHIPS, the DTC and Euroclear. There are
several reasons for this. First, central banks are often limited by charter to specific clearing
services, usually funds and government securities. But since the 1970s, the demand for other
clearing services has exploded, including foreign exchange, securities (both cross-border
and national), derivatives, and even airline tickets. 0 Second, the prevailing intellectual climate has favored the privatization of many activities, perhaps independently of individuated
risk-benefit assessments. Third, difficult issues of fairness and neutrality emerge when an
entity with central bank credit is permitted to compete vigorously with private sector participants. Neutrality is a valuable service of any clearing house or central bank, and banks
are not likely to accept either the neutrality or leadership of a competitor.3 ' Fourth, many
central banks might not have the technological expertise to provide these new clearing
services. Finally, perhaps, many central banks prefer a quiet life, free from new lines of
business with new risks and new operational requirements.
As a result, over the last thirty years a few private sector entities have assumed a tremendous amount of centralized liquidity risk. So far, they have done a good job. By and large,
their risk management has been sound and their operational reliability has been good. But
the relation between these private clearing entities and central banks remains unclear, a
topic to which this paper will return.
II. Liquidity Tools of Modem Central Banks
This section goes from history to practice. It discusses the various tools that central banks
may bring to bear on monetary liquidity crises-disruptions to the payment system. It is
important to emphasize up front that many of these tools are useful in other contexts:
monetary policy execution, workouts of troubled institutions, management ofnonmonetary
liquidity crises, and the like.32 Because this discussion is limited to monetary liquidity crises,
our assessment of these tools will be limited to their role in monetary liquidity crises.

29. The cost of collateral is the opportunity cost of pledging it. Collateral that, if not pledged, would have
been held in portfolio iscostless, apart from the administrative costs of effecting the pledge.
30. One of the more important English cases on multilateral netting originated from the insolvency of an
airline ticket clearing agency. British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v. Compagnie Nationale Air France 2
All E.R. 390 (1975), 1 W.L.R. 758 (1975), 2 Lloyd's Rep. 43 (1975).
31. See GoODHART, supra note 27, at 45-46.
32. For some examples, the Federal Reserve Banks lent liberally during the Penn Central crisis. See Brimmer, supra note 23, at 6, and supported the Franklin National Bank until a buyer could be found. See SPERo,
supra note 14, at 119-43.
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INSTITUTION-SPECIFIC LENDING

The most dramatic liquidity tool is lending to a specific institution. As discussed above,
modem liquidity crises occur when an institution realizes that the incoming day's payments
might not cover its outgoing payments. This is often caused by the failure or suspected
weakness of one institution, and the ripple effect that a failure would have on others. Lending
to a specific institution can be particularly useful in such cases, because it can be the most
direct way of ensuring that the day's payments will be made. Open-market operations at times
of monetary liquidity crisis may be less effective. In a monetary liquidity crisis, institutions
can have grave liquidity problems, even if overall market liquidity is otherwise good. If the
liquidity cannot be applied directly to the institutions in need, they may not make their
payments, affecting their counterparties who would otherwise have ample liquidity.
Such lending has two operational disadvantages, both stemming from the possible insolvency of the loan recipient. First, institution-specific lending poses legal risk to the central bank, even if the collateral is abundant and good. Many insolvency systems permit a
receiver to "avoid" preferential transfers. In such a case, the lender of last resort can find
itself with an unsecured claim on an insolvent debtor. Second, loan proceeds must be applied
to the day's payment obligations to do any good. This second disadvantage is usually muted,
because most central banks operate an interbank payments system. In such cases, lending
proceeds can be directly applied to payment obligations.
The risk of the borrower's economic insolvency is not relevant to monetary liquidity
lending, apart from the risks of avoidances and nonapplication of proceeds. Monetary liquidity lending is intended to push the day's payments through, without regard to the
balance sheet of borrowing institutions. The receiver is free to come in, when the day's
payments settle. It is no coincidence that Bagehot's rules for monetary liquidity lending
never mention the debtor's solvency as a criterion for lending, but only high interest and
quality collateral." The scope of this paper-and most of Bagehot's book-is limited to
monetary liquidity crises, not long-term credit support of an insolvent institution. It is true
that discount-window support is no substitute for capital, but it does not follow from this
that there is any "ancient injunction to central banks to lend only to illiquid banks, not
insolvent ones."3 4 The injunction is only that central bank lending should not seek to recapitalize insolvent banks."
One can imagine several classes of institutions that might be borrowers in a monetary
liquidity crisis. It may be worth listing them here, and discussing their roles.
1. Banks
Banks, of course, are the classic recipient of "lender-of-last-resort" lending. Monetary
liquidity crises emerge from the payment system, and banks have traditionally been the
exclusive occupant of the payment system. For our purposes, a bank is any institution that
maintains monetary liabilities for the general public. This could include a "nonbank" issuer
of e-money, but might exclude some special-purpose vehicles with a banking charter.

33. BAGEHOT, supra note 5, at 97.
34. Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of theFed's Discount Window, 74 FED. RESERVE BANK ST. Louis REV. 58
(1992).
35. "Federal Reserve credit is not a substitute for capital." 12 U.S.C. § 201.6(a) (2000).
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2. ClearingHouses
A clearing house (which includes most depositories, but not custodians) may be the single

strongest candidate for institution-specific lending. Even more than a bank, it is a focus of
contagion. The 1984 BONY problem was worrisome because it was a clearing house; the
1995 Barings problem was worrisome in large part because, over a weekend, nobody knew
36
if the Singapore clearing house could withstand the strain of Barings contracts.
3. Nonbank FinancialInstitutions

Many nonbank financial institutions, such as securities firms and some mutual funds, are
increasingly difficult to distinguish from banks. Perhaps they do not maintain third-party
monetary liabilities, but they often have access to clearing houses, which settle the cash leg
of the instrument they are clearing. A failure of one of these institutions would immediately
raise questions about the viability of its major banks or clearing houses.
4. Nonbank SemifinancialInstitutions

There are some institutions that, although arguably not financial institutions, have a
major impact on financial markets. For example, when the fraudulent conduct of its copper
trader was uncovered, Sumitomo Trading had been a major participant on the copper futures markets.
5. Other Nonbanks

It is difficult today to see how other nonbanks could contribute to a liquidity crisis. Since
the 1960s, we have lived through the insolvencies and reorganizations of many major nonbank institutions. Some of them may have created some asset-related liquidity problems;
none has come close to creating a monetary liquidity problem.
B.

MARKET LIQUIDITY

Bagehot famously recommended indiscriminate market lending (at a high rate of interest)
to resolve liquidity crises." This recommendation has resonance today.38 To Bagehot, the identity of the borrower was irrelevant; the high rate of interest would discourage those who did
not need the liquidity for prompt payment. He thought that any attempt to discriminate among
borrowers on any ground but the quality of their security would be counterproductive.
Central banks still use Bagehot's formula, although in modified form. In the United
States, injection of liquidity into the open market (rather than into a specific institution) is
not done through lending on securities, but instead is done through purchase of securities
by the Open Market Desk. The Open Market Desk will not deal with all comers, but only
with the "primary dealers" with whom it has a preexisting business relationship. Because
the technique is purchase instead of lending, the pricing is set by the market, rather than
by a central bank determination of interest rate. Because primary dealers employ all of their
funds in the routine course of their business, however, there is no need to worry about
hoarding of proceeds.

36. See FAY,supra note 17, at 226-28.
37. BACEHOT, supra note 5, at 97.
38. See Schwartz, supra note 34.
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EMERGENCY CLEARING FACILITIES

Institution-specific lending and open-market operations may be the most visible liquidity
tools, but they are not the only ones. Central banks have been known to establish emergency
clearing facilities to eliminate settlement risk. Such facilities usually involve a central bank
escrow, which allows parties to deliver funds knowing that the funds will be returned if the
parties do not receive their counterparties' funds. One example of this occurred in the
unwinding of Drexel in 1990.
After intensive discussions with Drexel (DBLT), which was required to produce evidence
of its solvency, the Bank of England put in place a settlement facility, which remained open
for a full week, to resolve this developing gridlock. Under this facility, DBLT's counterparties were invited to pay amounts due into accounts held in the Bank of England's name
with the bank's correspondent bank (in almost all cases the central bank) in each country
concerned. Once the bank had received confirmation that funds had been credited to these
accounts, it informed DBLT. DBLT then made irrevocable payments of countervalue to
each counterparty directly, using funds made available for the purpose by its immediate
parent company. Upon receipt of these payments, the respective counterparty was asked to
confirm to the Bank of England that it was prepared for the bank to release the relevant
in nonemergency payments
deposit to DBLT. 9 This sort of central bank escrow is used
40
contexts as well, such as the CHIPS Settlement Account.
D.

"MORAL SUASION"

Liquidity, of course, depends on confidence. A central bank can often restore confidence
with words, instead of its balance sheet. If a central bank can encourage parties to make
timely payments, or extend timely credit, a liquidity crisis may dissipate without need for
more action. "Moral suasion" is a common euphemism for such actions.
Due to its nature, moral suasion is difficult to pin down. However, the term (or related
ones) seems useful. Andrew Brimmer says that Chairman Volcker "played a key role" in
getting a consortium of banks to agree to lend to the Hunt brothers to resolve the silver
41
crisis of 1980. The Bank of England reportedly attempted to use moral suasion to resolve

the first and second Barings problems. 42 The phrase appears in journalistic descriptions of
43
the Central Bank of Thailand's recent efforts to defend the baht.
E.

BANK SUPERVISION, LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT AND MORAL HAZARD

1. Costs of Intervention
It is good to stop a liquidity crisis, but better still to assure that one never happens.
Liquidity crises are expensive, in terms of risk, managerial resources, ongoing confidence
in the system, and moral hazard. The cost is far less today than it was in the days of the
gold standard: central banks can create credible monetary liabilities without an expensive
stockpile of gold. But the cost, although less, is still real.

39. See SETTLEMENT RISK, supra note 14, at 6.
40. THE CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENT COMPANY L.L.C., CHIPS RULES AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES, para. l(a)(5) (1999).
41. Brimmer, supra note 23, at 10-11.

42. See Kevin Dowd, Competitive Banking, Bankers' Clubs and Bank Regulation, 26 J. MONEY CREDIT &
BANKING 289, 295 n.6 (1994).

43. James Sinclair, The Battle of the Babt, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1997, at 102.
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First, risk and resources. These costs are real, but no longer seem enormous. Many of
them, such as central bankers' time, are largely incidental to other central bank activities.
Intervention-even collateralized-does pose some risk to the central bank's balance sheet,
as discussed above. But as long as this risk is not major, we need not concern ourselves
further with risk and resources.
Second, and more important, is moral hazard. If central banks would stop every liquidity
problem at the early stages, institutions would not manage themselves to keep liquidity
crises from happening. This is the moral hazard problem in a nutshell: crisis intervention
can create perverse incentives (such as diminished internal liquidity management), which
can lead to future crises. This moral hazard problem is mitigated to some extent, because
liquidity management contains an externality. Banks that preserve adequate liquidity are
more likely to pay their counterparties. This implies that the counterparties can, to some
extent, free-ride off the risk-management efforts of better banks. We discuss moral hazard
in more detail below.
Another cost of intervention is that of intervening unnecessarily. The issue ofunnecessary
intervention is subtle, in several ways. First, there is the counterfactual problem-if we
intervene, we can never know if an intervention was really needed. We do know that most
stringencies in clearing credit work themselves out, every day. We also know that the cost
of not intervening when intervention is due would be enormous.
Second, there are the direct costs of an unnecessary intervention. As discussed above, these
are relatively low. The indirect costs of unnecessary intervention are higher. First, there are
the moral hazard issues alluded to above. Second, is confidence. Interventions suggest that
the system cannot take care of itself. But there is a more important indirect cost.
The tools used for monetary liquidity crises are often useful for other asset liquidity
crises, or for other purposes, such as workouts of troubled firms. Because few tools are
uniquely suited to monetary liquidity interventions, market participants can never be certain
why the central bank has intervened. Is it worried about monetary liquidity? Asset liquidity?
Is it trying to bail out a market participant? The central bank's actions will therefore be
misunderstood, at least some of the time. These misunderstandings create incentives, or at
least perceived incentives. Therefore, even pure monetary liquidity interventions may create
a set of moral hazards that are formally unrelated to monetary liquidity crises.
2. The Role of Supervision and Risk Management
Many of the costs of intervention are unavoidable. If a monetary liquidity crisis occurs,
something should be done to ease the crisis. In such cases, the costs of intervention are
often far less than the costs of nonintervention, and one intervenes with the tools most
appropriate to the crisis. But although interventions may be necessary when liquidity crises
occur, the frequency and severity of liquidity crises are controllable. The allied disciplines
of supervision and risk management are the most effective means for reducing the frequency
and severity of monetary liquidity crises.
Supervision and risk management share many roles. They decrease the vulnerability of
clearing and settlement arrangements to unexpected insolvencies through good system design and careful bilateral risk management. They ensure that most firms, most of the time,
will not have to scramble for liquidity. They help assure reasonable operational reliability
of systems. Supervision helps impart best-practices risk management to all supervised firms.
But supervision and risk management part their common ground in at least some respects.
To the extent that risk managers of institutions and clearing houses are subject to moral
SPRING 2000

100

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

hazard, they will under-invest in risk management. Also, as discussed above, liquidity crises
contain a free-rider problem. Because one firm's emergency liquidity provisions will help
other firms, the incentives of all firms to care for their emergency liquidity resources
are blunted.
A major job of supervision is to ensure that this does not happen: that private entities do
not create unnecessary risk, whether on the assumption that central banks will bail them
out of all systemic problems, or on the assumption that other banks will step in and supply
liquidity. This task employs many tools: examinations, regulatory standards, and commer44
cial and insolvency law reform, to name just three.
3. Some Common Misconceptions
Finally, it is worth clearing up some common misconceptions about monetary liquidity
lending. First, it is not a form of subsidy or capital support. Second, the moral hazard may
be more subtly distributed than is commonly believed.
First, the subsidy issue. Many central banks (including the Federal Reserve Banks) are
legally precluded from lending on uncollateralized terms.45 Monetary liquidity lending, if
fully collateralized and short-term, is neither a central bank subsidy nor a bailout. Fully
collateralized lending should impose no default risk on the lender. Such lending, therefore,
cannot simply be seen as a form of subsidy (defined as a wealth transfer by the central bank),
unless the risk-adjusted interest rate on the loan is below the interest rate that could be
realized on other central bank assets. Although the discount rate for Federal Reserve "adjustment" credits is close to the rate of government securities, any emergency credit commands a penalty rate. 46 Nor can collateralized lending be viewed as a form of capital support.
A short-term collateralized loan does not affect the capital of the borrower. It can break a
logjam in the payment system, but cannot "bail out" an insolvent borrower by providing
new capital.
Fully collateralized lending at an appropriate interest rate can only be viewed as a subsidy
or bailout if performed in conjunction with a recapitalization from another source of funds,
such as deposit insurance. Here, the subsidy would come from the insurer; the central bank
would merely facilitate the transaction, in a kind of indirect liquidity loan to the insurer. It
is worth noting that U.S. law strictly regulates this kind of transaction by making the central
47
bank responsible for any loss to the taxpayer.
Moral hazard goes to incentives: specifically, the perverse incentives created by central
bank action. These incentives may be somewhat different than most people suppose. The
usual story is that institution-specific lending creates perverse incentives for the firm receiving the funds. This is unlikely, even if one believes that liquidity lending saves firms
that would otherwise die.
Firms are not homogeneous entities. Even if institution-specific lending saves the firm,
it is less likely to save the firm's decision-makers: its management. Consider the fate of
Continental Illinois' management after its 1984 liquidity support. The entity survived; the
management did not. Or Franklin Bank in 1974, or Barings in 1995. The balance sheets

44. Law reform contains a free-rider problem: all banks benefit from law reform, even though only a few
banks assume the burden of law reform.
45. Section 13(1) of the Federal Reserve Act permits uncollateralized intraday clearing credit.
46. See12 C.F.R. §§ 201.3, 201.52 (2000).

47. See12 U.S.C. § 347b(b)(3) (2000).
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of these banks were not liquidated, because the husks of the banks were sold. But management was liquidated. This lesson has probably not been lost on the management of other
banks. Few managers believe that the regulator will bail them-personally-out.
The real moral hazard problem lies with the weak institution's strong counterparties. If
a manager knows that central banks will cause all payments to settle come what may, the
manager need not worry about payment risk posed by the weak institution. As long as the
manager's firm is solvent, and not conspicuously involved with the insolvent firm, the manager need have no career fears, and the manager's firm need not worry about systemic
liquidity problems. This kind of moral hazard is serious, but is inherent in any central bank
liquidity tool: institution-specific lending, market lending, emergency clearing facilities, or
even moral suasion. Fortunately, this moral hazard is mitigated in at least two ways. First,
measures that eliminate liquidity risk do not usually eliminate counterparty exposure, and
managers still have significant incentives to control counterparty risks. Second, supervision
of the payment system helps restore any missing incentives.
It should be noted that counterparty moral hazard is particularly significant in creditbased liquidity risk and perhaps less significant in operational liquidity risk. Counterparties
are better able to assess each others' credit than they are able to assess each others' potential
operational problems. On the other hand, this may be changing, because assessments of
counterparty operations are part of the Y2K planning efforts discussed below.
IIM. Application: Y2K
It is time to apply lessons learned to our future event, the century date change (Y2K)
problem. This section was written before January 1, 2000, and it will be instructive to see
how actual events comport with our discussion. But, before beginning the discussion, we
must repeat that this is an exercise only. Neither one of us has any information that would
lead us to believe that there will be a liquidity crisis associated with the century date change.
A.

ISSUES

The century date change on January 1, 2000, might cause widespread computer failures,
because many old computer programs (both software and hardwired into devices) use a twodigit year field. These programs know the year 1999 as "99." Unremediated computers may
see the next year as "00" and likely interpret it to mean 1900. These computers will, therefore,
see the century date change as a hundred-year leap into the past. Date-sensitive applications
would likely go awry. If these date-sensitive applications affect the clearing and settlement
system, we may have a major operational liquidity crisis. It is not only bank computer errors
that might affect the payment system. Electric power companies could be affected, stopping
banks without adequate backup facilities. Public transportation could perhaps stop, depriving
banks of key personnel and again shutting down the payment system.
This is an unusual operational problem: an anticipated one. (The Euro conversion was
similar.) Financial institutions have put tremendous effort into fixing their systems. The
likelihood of success is high, and the successful Euro conversion is further reason for confidence. But the Euro conversion was not without its glitches, and success in any endeavor
is never certain. Although we do not know whether problems will occur, at least we know
when any problems will occur: January 1, 2000, plus or minus a few days or weeks. 48 In
48. January 1, 2000, is a Saturday, a bank holiday in most jurisdictions. Despite this, ATM machines and
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some ways, the Y2K problem is a gift, because the curse of operational problems is that
they are usually unanticipated. Because the Y2K problem is anticipated, we have the luxury
of contingency planning for a specific event.
An abstract discussion of the Y2K issue goes only so far before it resembles science fiction.
We do not know what will happen, but we can hope to prepare for it. It is now time to get
more concrete and discuss some contingency planning for the Y2K issue. We will discuss
the contingency efforts of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and other
United States federal banking regulators.
B. FRBNY

EFFORTS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

FRBNY Y2K efforts can be divided into two categories: operational risk-reduction and
contingency planning in the case that some risks come to fruition.
1. OperationalRisk-Reduction
The supervisory efforts have been divided into three phases. Phase I focused on awareness, assessment and early remediation, and was concluded by early 1998. Phase II focused
on testing, remediation and contingency planning, and was concentrated in the second half
of 1998 and the first quarter of 1999. Most of the 1998 Phase II activities involved testing
of systems, assessments of counterparties' credit and contingency risk, and assessments and
remediation of vendors and service providers. The 1999 activities involved testing and
contingency planning. Phase III is largely concerned with additional contingency planning
49
and follow-up on banks' compliance with Phase I.
One element of these supervisory efforts is particularly noteworthy: assessment of counterparties' (and to a lesser extent, vendors') contingency risk. This is reminiscent of the
counterparty credit risk management that has become increasingly universal, and rigorous,
since the Herstatt debacle. It is not inconceivable that operational risk will ultimately be as
much part of the supervisory trade as credit risk.
Most supervised institutions have been able to comply with these supervisory efforts. The
U.S. financial services industry seems reasonably ready for the Y2K event, although nothing
will be certain until the century date change.
2. Contingency Planning
Distinct from risk-reduction efforts is contingency planning, in case some risks come to
fruition. The broad scope of supervisory contingency planning is widely known. 0 Here, we
shall discuss a few details of Federal Reserve contingency planning. There is little to be
said about the least likely but most dramatic contingency: significant operational problems
that directly create a liquidity crisis on January 3, 2000 (or related days.) Other contingencies are more likely, however, and deserve discussion.
The fear of a Y2K liquidity crisis is, by now, much more likely than an actual operational
crisis. The banking business is a business of confidence, and fear is a genuine contingency

other operations will be in service on that day. The first bank business day in the United States is January 3.
However, because some financial transactions have a multiday settlement period, we might expect to see some
operational problems develop in late December.
49. See Federal Reserve SR Letters No. 97-16, 98-17, 99-2.
50. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PLANNING BY FINANCIAL MARKET AUTHORITIES FORYEAR
2000 CONTINOENCIES (1999).
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in itself. The Federal Reserve System has, therefore, been planning for two kinds of contingencies that may develop, even if a Y2K operational crisis does not. Both of these contingencies involve substantial liquidity distortions and arise from fear of a real liquidity
crisis. Neither of these contingencies, however, are true liquidity crises in themselves.
First, it is possible that consumers will decide to run from bank accounts to currency
near the end of the year. This could have two effects. First, and more obviously, more
currency will need to go into circulation. Second, the balance sheets of banks-especially
consumer banks-may become distorted, as bank liabilities are converted into currency,
forcing such banks either to liquidate assets or find new liabilities.
Second, it is possible that commercial customers will disrupt traditional funding patterns
in search of institutions with low perceived operational risk. There is an irony to this second
risk. The banking industry has prepared for Y2K operational problems perhaps more than
any other. Banks' more sophisticated customers know this and may seek additional bank
funding in preference to nonbank sources. The perceived success of banks' Y2K contingency planning may perversely create Y2K-related burdens to the banking industry.
To address these problems (as well as actual Y2K operational risk), the Federal Reserve
has taken several steps.
3. Banks Are Encouragedto Use the Discount Window as Partof Their Contingency Planning
For institutions that have prepositioned themselves, with collateral and lending agreements in place, "the Federal Reserve is available to meet liquidity needs under appropriate
circumstances. . . ."" This statement should not be considered as an enforceable promise
to lend; it is not. 2 It is, however, definitely an invitation for banks to use the discount
window as part of their Y2K contingency liquidity planning. This invitation does not begin
on January 3. Banks are encouraged to obtain Y2K-related liquidity well before that date.
To some extent, this policy recognizes that operational monetary liquidity crises are more
dependent on direct lending than credit monetary liquidity crises. Credit liquidity crises
can often be resolved with a large infusion of liquidity. It matters less who gets the liquidity
than whether the liquidity is provided at all. Most typical recipients will apply the proceeds
to their payment obligations, providing downstream recipients with the means to make
their payments. However, this transmission belt is likely to be broken in an operational
crisis, such as the Y2K crisis. If a party in need does not directly receive liquidity, it may
not be able to make the day's payments at all.
4. Y2K "LombardFacility"
Because fears of Y2K operational problems might disrupt traditional funding patterns,
the Federal Reserve System has created a special liquidity facility for Y2K lending. The
authorizing regulation states:
Federal Reserve Banks may extend credit between and including October 1, 1999, and April
7, 2000, under a special liquidity facility to ease liquidity pressures during the century date
change period ....This type of credit is granted at a special rate above the basic discount rate

51. Remarks by Governor Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. to North American Clearing House Association
(Apr. 13, 1999).
52. Nor could it be. See12 U.S.C. § 347b(b)(4) (1999) (Federal Reserve Banks are under no legal obligation
to lend).
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and other market rates for funds [i.e., 150 basis points over the targeted federal funds rate], is
available for the entire length of the period, and is not subject to the conditions regarding
specific use or exhaustion of other liquidity sources as is adjustment credit."
This type of lending is structured as a "Lombard facility." It charges a high interest rate
to avoid any need to ration credit by purpose. If banks have their traditional funding patterns
disrupted or are in the position of extending credit to nontraditional customers, they may
want to take advantage of an available-but not inexpensive-source of funds. They do
not have to prove that their traditional funding patterns have been disrupted; the willingness
of a creditworthy institution to seek high-cost funds is proof enough. It is, therefore, unlike
ordinary Federal Reserve "adjustment credit," extended only for certain short-term liquidity
needs.
5. Curremy and Community Banks
Fears of Y2K problems might cause a consumer run for currency, even if operational
problems never develop. The Federal Reserve System has spent considerable effort planning
for this contingency and will be holding about $70 billion in excess currency for spikes in
domestic and international demand.
Such a demand for currency could cause a major distortion in the balance sheets of
community banks and credit unions. The special discount window liquidity facility will
mitigate this distortion. The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City will also provide a special
liquidity line to a special purpose vehicle, which would lend to U.S. Central Credit Union,
which would, in turn, provide liquidity support to corporate credit unions, ultimately ex54
tending to individual credit unions.
6. Lending to Nonbanks Cannot Be Ruled Out
Since the Great Depression, Federal Reserve Banks have not used their authority to lend
to nonbanks. All lending has been to banks-originally just "member banks" and now any
"depository institution." Nevertheless, Congress strengthened the statutory authority for
nonbank lending in 1991.
The legal standard for lending to nonbanks is much more specific than the legal standards
for bank lending. Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act states that such lending may
only be made in "unusual and exigent" circumstances, and the lending Federal Reserve
Bank must satisfy itself that the debtor "is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations
from other banking institutions." These statutory conditions are likely to be met by a Y2K
disaster. An alternative source of authority-section 13(13) of the Federal Reserve Actcontains no statutory restrictions on criteria for lending to nonbanks, but restricts eligible
collateral to United States or agency obligations. Regulation A (the Board's interpretation
of sections 13(3) and 13(13)) adds an additional requirement to both section 13(3) and
13(13): that "failure to obtain such credit would adversely effect the economy."
It is worth noting that the mechanics of emergency lending to nonbanks would be much
more difficult than lending to banks, especially if there is little time to prepare. As discussed
above, most banks will be prepositioned for lending, with collateral and lending agreements

53. 12 C.F.R. § 201.3(e) (2000).
54. See Letter 99-CU-I Ito Federally Insured Credit Unions from National Credit Union Administration.
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in place. A nonbank would probably not be prepositioned, and it might be difficult to obtain
collateral and execute a lending agreement in the course of a day, even if a lender of last
resort felt comfortable with the credit status of the nonbank.
It is important to stress that the Federal Reserve has articulated no policy on Y2K lending
to nonbanks. Any lending under section 13(3) authority would require the consent of five
members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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